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 The launch of a new Round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) at Doha 
dealt a needed blow to the anti-globalizers who had triumphed at Seattle just two years 
ago. But it was important for a different reason as well. The word “Development” now 
graces unconventionally the name of the new Round, alongside Doha. Development of 
the poor countries will be the central objective of the new Round.  
But, pleasing rhetoric aside, we must ask: what does this mean? The question is 
not an idle one. For, if the current thinking in policy and NGO circles on what is the 
appropriate answer is any guide to what is in store for the poor countries, there is cause 
for alarm.   
Of course, the proponents of trade have always considered that trade is the policy 
and development is the objective. The postwar experience only proves them right. The 
objections advanced by a handful of dissenting economists, claiming that free traders 
exaggerate the gains from trade or forget that good trade policy is best embedded within a 
package of reforms, mostly set up and knock down straw men, or aunt sallies, depending 
on your gender preference.  
But if trade is indeed good for the poor countries, what can be done to enhance its 
value for them? A great deal. But not until we confront and discard several 
misconceptions that make for bad prescriptions. Among them: 
· the world trading system is “unfair”: the poor countries face protectionism 
that is more acute than their own; 
· the rich countries have wickedly held on to their trade barriers against poor 
countries while using the Bretton Woods institutions to force down the trade 
barriers of the poor countries; and 
· it is “hypocritical” to ask poor countries to reduce their trade barriers when the 
rich countries have their own. 
Asymmetry of Trade Barriers Goes the Other Way 
Take industrial tariffs.  As of today, the rich-country tariffs average 3 percent but 
13 percent for the poor countries. Nor do peaks in tariffs, concentrated in textiles and 
garments, fisheries and footwear and clearly directed at the poor countries, change the 
picture much: UNCTAD has estimated that they apply to only a third of the poor-country 
exports. Moreover, the trade barriers of the poor countries are the more significant 
restraints faced by the poor countries than those imposed by the rich countries. 
The situation is little different on the use of anti-dumping actions, the classic “fair 
trade” instrument that has ironically been used “unfairly” to undermine free trade. The 
“new” users, among them Argentina, Brazil, India, South Korea, South Africa and 
Mexico, are now filing more anti-dumping complaints than the rich countries. [Chart]. 
Between July and December 2001 alone, India carried out the largest number anywhere 
of anti-dumping investigations.  
These facts fly in the face of the populist myth that the rich countries, often acting 
through the conditionality imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, have demolished the trade barriers of the poor countries while holding on to their 
own trade barriers. Indeed, both the omnipotence of the Bretton Woods institutions, and 
the self-serving wickedness of the rich countries, have been grossly exaggerated, 
accounting for the allegations being the opposite of the true facts. 
The World Bank’s conditionality is so extensive and diffused, and its need to lend 
so compelling, that it can be bypassed: many client states typically satisfy some while 
ignoring other conditionalities. Besides, countries go to the IMF when there is a 
stabilization crisis. Since stabilization requires that the excess of expenditures over 
income be brought into line, the IMF has often been reluctant to suggest tariff reductions: 
they could reduce revenues, exacerbating the crisis.  
Then again, since countries are free to return to their bad ways once the crisis is 
past, and the loans repaid, there can be reversals of the tariff reforms: unlike at the WTO, 
countries do not “bind” their tariff reductions at Bretton Woods. Equally, reversals in 
tariff reductions can occur when a stabilization crisis has recurred and the tariffs are re-
imposed for revenue purposes. My student Ravi Yatawara, who has studied what he calls 
“commercial policy switches”, documents several instances of such tariff reduction 
reversals by countries borrowing from the IMF.  For instance, Uruguay in 1971 increased 
protection during an IMF program which began the year before and even managed to get 
another credit tranche the year after. Kenya’s 1977 liberalization was reversed in 1979, 
the year that another arrangement was negotiated with the IMF.  
Moreover, the comparatively higher trade barriers against the labour- intensive 
products are not the product of wickedness but are to be explained mostly by simple 
political economy. While unilateral reductions of trade barriers are not uncommon, and I 
document them for many countries and several sectors in the postwar period in my new 
book, Going Alone: The Case for Relaxed Reciprocity in Freeing Trade (MIT Press: 
2002), the fact remains tha t the developing countries were exempted by the economic 
ideology of the time, which embraced Special and Differential (S&D) treatment for them, 
from having to make trade concessions of their own at the successive MTNs that reduced 
trade barriers in the postwar period. The rich countries, denied reciprocal concessions 
from the poor countries, wound up concentrating on liberalizing trade in products of 
interest largely to one another: e.g. machinery, chemicals, manufactures other than 
textiles and garments.  If you want a free lunch, you do not get to eat at the Lord Mayor’s 
banquet.  
The situation changed when the poor countries became players. We then 
managed, in 1995 at Marrakesh where the Uruguay Round was concluded, to get at the 
infamous Multifibre Arrangement, which had grown from its birth in 1961 as the Short-
term Cotton Textile Arrangement  into a Frankenstein by 1974 when it brought under one 
umbrella several separate restrictive agreements restricting world trade in all textiles.  
MFA was put on the block, scheduled to terminate at the end of ten years. 
But even if rich-country protectionism were asymmetrically higher, it would be 
dangerous to argue that it is then “hypocritical” to suggest to the poor countries to reduce 
their own trade barriers. Except in the few cases (hardly applicable to the poor countries) 
where strategic tit-for-tat play is credible, the net effect of matching others’ protection 
with one’s own is to hurt oneself twice over.  
There is ample evidence that many leaders of the poor countries have predictably 
made the wrong inference: that rich-country hypocrisy excuses, and justifies, going easy 
on relaxing their own trade barriers. We should instead be saying to the rich countries 
something quite different: If you hold on to your own protection no matter how much 
smaller, and in fact even raise it as the United States did recently with steel and the Farm 
Bill, you are going to undermine seriously the efforts of the leaders in the poor countries 
who have turned to freer trade in recent decades. For, it is difficult to reduce protection if 
others, more prosperous and more fierce supporters of free trade, are breaking ranks.  
Exports from the Poor Countries 
 In fact, the protectionism of the poor and the rich countries must be viewed 
together symbiotically to ensure effective exports by the poor countries. Thus, even if the 
doors to the markets of the rich countries were fully open to imports, the exports from the 
poor countries would have to get past their own doors.  
 We know from numerous case studies, dating back to the 1970s that only 
corroborated elementary economic logic, that one’s own protection is often the cause of 
dismal export, and hence economic, performance. It creates a “bias against exports” by 
sheltering domestic markets that become then more lucrative. Just ask yourself why, even 
though India and the Far Eastern countries faced virtually the same external trade 
barriers, the inward- looking India registered a miserable export performance for a quarter 
of a century since the 1960s while the outward- looking South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore 
and Hong Kong chalked up spectacular exports. Charity begins at home; so do exports 
begin with a good domestic policy. In the near-exclusive focus on rich-country 
protectionism, this dramatic lesson has been perilously lost from view. 
Effectively Assaulting Rich-country Protectionism 
 Yet, rich-country protectionism matters too; and it must be effectively assaulted. 
And we should be able to lend a strong helping hand, by countervailing the lobbying that 
makes it hard to make a dent, reinforcing the good work that reciprocal bargaining does. 
But here too, we witness folly.  
The current fashion is to shame the rich countries by arguing that their protection 
hurts the poor countries whose poverty is the focus of renewed international efforts. And 
where action is actually undertaken, the preference is for granting preferences to the 
poorer countries, with yet deeper preferences to the poorest among them (the “Least 
Developed Countries” as they are now called) instead of giving MFN tariff reductions, 
and reducing subsidies in non-discriminatory fashion, in products of export interest to the 
poor countries. But the former solution is woefully inadequate; the latter is downright 
wrong. 
 If shame was sufficient, there would be no rich-country protectionism left: trade 
economists and international institutions such as the GATT and UNCTAD have 
denounced the rich countries on this count over three decades! Added support, such as 
that by today’s “charities” such as Oxfam, could nonetheless help in principle. But these 
charities need both informed expertise and a talent for strategy and not just a conscience 
with a voice to do so. They fall short. 
Regrettably, by subscribing to the counterproductive language of  hypocrisy and 
the ill-advised resort to the rhetoric of “unfair trade” to attack  protection by the rich 
when the phrase is a code word for protectionism today in the rich countries, a charity 
such as Oxfam, splendid at fighting plagues and famines,  even does more harm than 
good in our good fight. One must remark that mission creep, even by non-creeps, can be 
an added  problem rather than part of the solution 
An effective strategy requires that we handle the labour-intensive goods such as 
textiles separately from agriculture. The differences between them dwarf the 
commonalities. The labour- intensive goods in the rich countries typically employ their 
own poor, the unskilled. To argue that we should eliminate protection, harming them 
simply because it helps yet poorer folks abroad, runs into evident ethical (and hence 
political) difficulties. The answer must be a gradual but certain, phase-out of the 
protection coupled with a simultaneous and substantial adjustment and retraining 
program. That way, we address the problems of the poor both at home and abroad. 
Once this is done, one can ask the church groups and the charities  to endorse this 
 Balanced and just program. It is morally more compelling than either marching against 
free trade to protect the workers in the labour- intensive industries of the rich nations 
while forgetting the needs of the poor workers in the poor countries or asking for these 
trade restrictions to be abolished without providing for the workers in them in the rich 
countries. 
The removal of agricultural protection does not raise similar ethical problems as 
when you hurt your poor workers: the production and export subsidies in the US and the 
EU go mainly to the large farmers. That should make it easier to assault it on grounds of 
helping the poor countries. At the same time, however, unlike textiles et al, agricultural 
protectionism is energetically defended on grounds of “multifunctionality”: that 
agriculture has to do not just with production and trade but also with preservation of 
greenery and the environment. The greens are therefore in play and make protectionism 
more difficult to remove. But, just as income support can be de- linked from increasing 
production and exports, measures to support greenery also can be and such new 
measures, and other environmental protections added as sweeteners, must be part of the 
strategic assault on agricultural protection. 
Drawing on the way that a target date such as Jubilee 2000 focused efforts on the 
objective of debt relief, I suggested well over a year ago, with a nod in its direction by 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, a Jubilee 2010 movement to eliminate protection on 
labour- intensive products by 2010.  Since agricultural protection is politically a harder 
nut to crack, and will surely take more time, 2010 cannot be a realistic target date for its 
demise: 2020 is more realistic if we are serious. Both rich and poor nations’ leaders need 
to endorse Jubilee 2010 therefore to terminate protection of labour- intensive goods and 
Jubilee 2020 for eliminating protection of agriculture. A start can be made at 
Johannesberg’s mammoth UN Conference on “Sustainable Development”: a catchall 
phrase than can extend to any virtuous program.  
Preferences: The Wrong Way 
 But a final word is necessary on the efforts to open the rich-country doors, not by 
reducing barriers on an MFN basis, but through grant of preferences to the poor 
countries. This approach goes back to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 
introduced in 1971 through a waiver and then granted legal status in 1979 with the 
“Enabling Clause” at the GATT in 1979. The eligible poor countries were granted entry 
at preferentially lower tariff rates. 
GSP did little for the poor countries. The eligible products often excluded 
products with significant export potential. Thus, the US GSP scheme excluded textiles 
and clothing, and footwear. Upper caps were also placed: the US imposed a $100 million 
limit on exports per tariff line, per year, per country; beyond this limit, the preferential 
rate terminated. Even the benefits granted  were not “bound” and could be varied at the 
rich country’s displeasure. Thus, when India was put on the Special 301 list in 1991 and 
the USTR determined unilaterally that India’s intellectual property protection was 
“unreasonable”, the President suspended duty-free privileges under GSP for $60 million 
in trade from India in April 1992.  
GSP was often terminated on commodities and on countries when they began to 
be successfully exported: a fact documented in a forthcoming econometric study by 
Caglar Ozden and Eric Reinhardt.  Rules of origin also served to moderate exports: 
exported items had to satisfy stringent local-content specifications to qualify as 
originating in the country before they could get GSP benefits.   
 By going down a similar preferential route in giving market access to the poor  
 countries today, as with the US’s Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), or to 
only the poorest among them, as with the EU’s “everything but arms”(EBE)  initiative for 
eliminating trade barriers only for the 49 “Least Developed Countries”,  the rich countries 
are doing no better since virtually every drawback of GSP obtains in these schemes as 
well. If anything, these new schemes are doing worse. Thus, reverse preferences for US 
fabrics are built into the preferences for African garments exports to the US under 
AGOA. 
 It also sets off poor nations against other poor nations since preferences typically 
tend to lead to trade diversion away from non-preferred nations. It is also a wasting asset 
since the preferences are relative to the MFN tariff which will likely decline with further 
MTN liberalization. As such, and also because preferences given without bindings and 
can be withdrawn readily for political reasons, investors are not likely to respond.  
 Preferences sound attractive and generous and the poor countries have accepted 
them as such. But this has been a mistake. There is no good substitute for the MFN 
reduction of trade barriers in the rich countries. It should go hand in hand with enhanced 
technical and financial assistance preferentially focused on the poor nations so they can 
exploit the trade opportunities opened up non-preferentially.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
